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1. Introduction. 
In the past eight years the Italian system of industrial relations has 
been undergoing a prolonged transitional phase (Carrieri and Treu 2013; 
Barbera and Perulli 2014; Leonardi and Sanna 2015; Guarriello 2014; 
Gottardi 2016). The numerous events that have occurred have changed 
some of its traits within a relatively short period. The various causes are 
both exogenous and endogenous, economic as well as institutional. The 
main exogenous factors are globalisation, the financial crisis and the 
economic downturn, as well as interventions by international institutions in 
national policy-making. This scenario is to some extent shared with other 
countries and is currently exerting pressure on different models of 
industrial relations (Katz and Darbishire 2000) towards neoliberal 
convergence (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 2011). Under growing 
pressure from so-called ‘New European Economic Governance’ (NEEG), 
many national lawmakers – and especially in the Southern European 
countries (Rocha 2014; J. Cruces et al. 2015; Leonardi 2016) – have 
stepped up deep labour law reforms, with the purpose of reducing the 
traditional prioritisation of multi-employer bargaining and the favourability 
principle, allowing company-level agreements to derogate in pejus from 
higher bargaining levels or even labour legislation (Marginson 2014; Van 
Gyes and Schulten 2015; Bordogna and Pedersini 2015; Cella 2016).  
The endogenous factors include the structural weakness of the Italian 
economy, with its macroeconomic imbalances, territorial and social 
dualisms, stagnating productivity and competitiveness, inadequate 
development of human capital and very segmented labour market. 
However, problems in the field of industrial relations are also relevant. In 
the European Commission’s 2016 country report on Italy, the national 
collective bargaining system is described as ‘unclear and unspecified’. 
Based on collective agreements binding on only the signatory parties, its 
effects are uncertain and of limited impact. Extension erga omnes is not 
automatic, the assessment of trade union representativeness is not yet 
operational, and bargaining at the enterprise level and productivity rates 
remain underdeveloped (European Commission 2016). 
Most of the Commission’s remarks are on target. The Italian collective 
bargaining system is in fact a complex and precarious mishmash of 
obscurely stratified conventional and statutory interventions. The public 
sector, large-scale private industry, banks, craft industry and SMEs, as well 
as agriculture all have their own systems, with framework agreements that 
often remain in place even though they have expired, without being 
properly updated or replaced. 
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Meanwhile, the country has been suffering what the Governor of the 
Bank of Italy and other commentators have described as the worst years 
in its peacetime history. Between 2007 and 2013, in particular, GDP fell by 
9 percentage points, industrial production by 25 per cent and investment 
by 30 per cent, while the unemployment rate has doubled and productivity 
has stagnated. Social distress persists, productivity remains low and 
workers are still not feeling any positive effects from a very timid economic 
recovery (+ 1.5 per cent is expected for the end of 2017). Between 2009 
and 2016, real wage dynamics (adjusted for inflation, which is still low) 
remained lower than in the pre-crisis years. Wages decreased by 2.3 per 
cent in 2011–2012, when inflation was higher than expected, but increased 
by more than 2 per cent in 2013–2015, when the cost of living fell markedly 
(by 0.5 per cent per year, on average), below what had been laid down in 
the collective agreements (Banca d’Italia 2017). The unemployment level 
is still almost double that of the pre-crisis years, while precarious work 
continues to hinder progress with productivity and private consumption 
growth.  
In this article, we describe how all these challenges are affecting and 
transforming some of the key features of collective bargaining in Italy. The 
recent state interventionism on the labour market and industrial relations 
has posed a serious challenge to the traditional primacy of multi-employer 
bargaining and has exacerbated an insidious process of segmentation with 
regard to labour standards and protections.  
Currently, the debates between the social partners and policy-makers 
concern three co-related issues in particular: 
(i) the political role of the unions and social dialogue, in a period in which 
tripartite concertation – a pillar of the economic recovery in the 1990s 
– has repeatedly been given up for dead; 
(ii)  the relations between law and collective autonomy in the process of 
laying down new rules on industrial relations as a whole;  
(iii) the new structure of collective bargaining in a time of epochal changes 
for labour and the economy. 
Generally speaking, the core issues and achievements seem to be as 
follows:  
(a) how a new reformed collective bargaining system can enhance 
productivity and national economic performance, which have 
stagnated for too long; and 
(b) whether, in this context, Italian collective bargaining can still be 
described as organised – or rather, disorganised – decentralisation 
(Traxler 1995).  
As we will try to demonstrate, the collective bargaining system has 
preserved a certain degree of organised coordination, despite some 
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attempts to dismantle it, as has been the case in other EU member states 
during the same period. Social dialogue remains fairly lively and reactive, 
as clearly indicated by the inter-confederal agreements on 
representativeness and collective bargaining (2011–2014). The system’s 
capacity and efforts to reform itself should also be appreciated, as should 
the willingness of the three main trade union confederations to overcome 
harsh divisions between 2009 and 2011. These developments deserve to 
be adequately supported by the state by means of auxiliary legislation that 
– transposing the best outcomes of social dialogue – restores to the system 
as a whole the certainty, transparency and enforceability that are currently 
missing.  
The situation is very open and evolving and over the coming months 
we may well see more clearly whether the turmoil of these long, critical 
years is reaching an end.  
2. The structure of collective bargaining in Italy: actors, 
norms and processes. 
Similar to other Latin countries, the Italian system is based on the 
principle of trade union pluralism, rooted in the ideological conflicts 
emerging from the ruins of the Second World War. Since the late 1940s, 
there have been three central union confederations: the General Italian 
Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Workers’ 
Unions (CISL) and the Italian Union of Labour (UIL).4  
Italian trade unions can still draw on significant power resources 
(Leonardi 2017). Union density has declined in Italy, too, but the downward 
trend has been slower and much more contained than elsewhere. It was 
41 per cent in 1980 and is now estimated at 38 per cent (Cazes et al., 
2017).5 This is still one of the highest rates in the world (ICTWSS 2015), 
behind only Belgium and the Nordic countries. Italy still has the highest 
number of trade union members in absolute terms (over 11 million) 
because of the high number of pensioners who remain affiliated.  
The employers’ organisational density is estimated at around 50 per 
cent. Employers’ associations are organised according to the size, sectoral 
type, legal status and political orientation of the affiliated companies, which 
                                                             
4 Unions of minor importance include UGL, originally close to the post-fascists, a plethora of 
professional ‘autonomous’ unions, which are particularly strong in the financial sector, public 
services, schools and transport, and also radical left-wing unions (USB), significant only in 
individual branches or plants.  
5 There are 6 million active members in the three main confederations alone, out of a total of 
approximatively 17 million dependent employees. 
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intersect in various ways (Bellardi, 2016).6 Umbrella confederations are 
organised – on both the workers’ and the employers’ sides – in a number 
of sector/branch peak federations. There are roughly a dozen on the trade 
union side, but hundreds on the employers’ side. This is one reason why 
there are so many national sectoral agreements, as we shall see. In a single 
manufacturing sector, there might be at least four national collective 
bargaining units, according to firm size and type: large, small or medium, 
craft industry and cooperatives.  
The Italian industrial relations system has a high level of voluntarism, 
at least in the private sector, while in the public sector most aspects are 
governed by the law. The 1948 constitutional provisions concerning the 
registration of trade unions and the attribution of bargaining capacity at 
sectoral level in proportion to the number of members, legal regulation of 
the right to strike and workers’ rights to participate in company decision-
making have never been transposed into law. After the Fascist era, in the 
new democratic system trade unions remained reluctant to be subjected to 
state control over their internal organisation, while they opted for collective 
autonomy with regard to strikes and collective bargaining, rejecting state 
statutory interventionism. Nevertheless, as a result of the spectacular 
increase in union power after the ‘hot Autumn’ of 1969, legislation was 
enacted in the form of the Workers’ Statute (Act No. 300 of 1970) to 
strengthen union rights in the workplace.  
Apart from that one, and with regard to the public sector,7 there are 
no Italian laws regulating either floor wage setting or collective agreements 
effects. Italy is the only EU member state, besides Sweden and Denmark, 
that has neither a statutory minimum wage nor a formal administrative 
extension procedure to guarantee universal coverage of collective 
agreements (Leonardi 2017).  
Collective bargaining depends on mutual recognition by the social 
partners; collective agreements are acts of private law, considered as 
expressions of the signatories’ self-regulatory capacity and subject only to 
the general provisions of the Civil Code of 1942. Collective agreements are 
                                                             
6 The Italian trade union landscape is much more fragmented than in the rest of Europe, 
where the historical and most influential umbrella confederations are Confindustria, which 
affiliates medium-large manufacturing enterprises, Confapi (SMEs), Confartigianato and CNA 
(craft sector), Confcooperative and Lagacoop (cooperatives), ABI (banks), ANIA (insurance), 
Confcommercio, Confesercenti (trade) and Confagricoltura (agriculture). 
7 Since the late 1990s there has been a law concerning the selection of representative unions 
that are entitled to bargain (Legislative Decree No. 296/1997 and 165/2001, Art. 43). Unions 
need to pass a threshold of 5 per cent to take part in national collective bargaining, whereas 
a final agreement is binding if signed by unions representing at least 51 per cent of the 
relevant workforce. These thresholds are calculated as a weighted average between votes 
and members in the branch’s companies. 
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not legally binding, so their contents are formally enforceable only by the 
signatories’ affiliates. The law has primacy over collective agreements, and 
collective agreements over individual agreements. Statutory rights and 
conventional minimum standards cannot be derogated in pejus, but only 
in mejus, by lower level collective or individual agreements.8 If more than 
one industry-wide agreement is signed in the same contractual unit – as is 
happening more and more often – the Courts tend to favour the one signed 
by ‘comparatively the most representatives’, applying a series of 
measuring criteria. But it is not always easy. 
Since the signing of the tripartite agreement on 23 July 1993, the 
Italian collective bargaining system has been two-level and articulated 
hierarchically, with priority given to national industry-level collective labour 
agreements, followed by company-level agreements, or, alternatively, 
territorial agreements, where firms are too small and there are no workers’ 
representatives, as in such sectors as crafts, agriculture, construction, 
retail and tourism. 
National sectoral bargaining is the core of the system. It establishes a 
floor of rights and standards that secondary-level bargaining – which is 
facultative – must comply with, integrating, adapting and generally 
improving pay and working conditions, in accordance with the favourability 
principle. Among their main tasks, national agreements establish sectoral 
wage floors according to different job levels, protecting wage earners’ 
purchasing power against inflation. As no formal extension mechanisms 
are provided to widen agreements’ binding effect, a problem might arise in 
terms of equal treatment among workers employed in the same branch, 
territory or even company. Such problems could be particularly acute in 
the case of minimum wages. The problem has found an indirect solution – 
a sort of functional equivalent – based on judicial resort to Article 36 of the 
Italian Constitution. It states that employees’ remuneration must be 
‘commensurate with the quantity and quality of their work and in any case 
sufficient to ensure them and their families a free and dignified existence’. 
As interpreted by the labour courts, this concept of commensurate and 
sufficient pay corresponds to the wage floors, differentiated by job 
classification, set up by the national sectoral agreement to which the 
individual worker is subject. The collectively agreed base wage is inserted 
automatically into individual employment contracts and represents the 
                                                             
8 By virtue of Art. 2077 of the Civil Code, clauses and terms of individual contracts, pre-
existing or subsequent to the collective agreement, are by law replaced by those of the 
collective agreement, except if it contains special terms that are more favourable to 
employees. However, waivers and transactions concerning employee rights covered under 
mandatory provisions of laws and contracts or collective agreements, are not valid (Art. 
2113).  
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minimum, not liable to eventual derogations. In this way, the system 
achieves the double objective of having a ‘constitutional’ minimum wage, 
laid down by law or administrative extension procedures, and preserves 
trade union sovereignty over wage bargaining.  
Collectively agreed minimum wages are, on average, higher both in 
absolute terms and relative to the median wage (Kaitz index), estimated 
to be the highest in Europe, at 80 per cent (ratio between the minimum 
and the median wage) (Kampelmann et al. 2014).  
 
Table 1 Hourly sectoral minimum wages, Italy, 2008–2015 (euro/hour and Kaitz index) 
 
Year Hourly 
Minimum wages 
Kaitz index 
(% of median) 
2008 7.99 74.62 
2009 8.22 74.88 
2010 8.46 75.13 
2011 8.91 78.35 
2012 9.06 76.07 
2013 9.22 76.20 
2014 9.32 80.53 
2015 9.41 79.95 
 
Source: Garnero’s calculation based on ISTAT negotiated wages database LFS, 2017. 
 
 
Table 2 Hourly sectoral minimum wage by sector, Italy (euros/hour and Kaitz index, 2015) 
 
 Hourly 
minimum wages 
Kaitz index (% of 
national median) 
Agriculture and mining 7.70 59.44 
Manufacturing, electricity 9.47 73.11 
Construction 8.55 66.03 
Retail trade 8.43 66.11 
Transport 8.95 69.08 
Hotels and restaurants 8.41 64.92 
ICT 9.19 70.94 
Finance and insurance 12.95 99.97 
Public administration 9.72 75.04 
 
Source: Garnero’s calculation based on ISTAT negotiated wages database LFS, 2017. 
 
 
The lack of a legal extension mechanism has not impeded a very high 
collective bargaining coverage, never estimated to be below 80 per cent 
by international sources and an impressive 99.4 per cent by national 
sources (CNEL-ISTAT 2015). Employees in all branches and companies are 
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– in theory at least – covered by a multi-employer agreement. At the 
moment, there are 809 signed and archived agreements (CNEL 2016). 
However, non-compliance rates are not negligible in a country in which 
levels of evasion – for example, via informal workers or bogus self-
employment – are among the highest in a sample of EU countries. In 
particular, ‘wages at the bottom of the distribution appear to be largely 
unaffected by minimum wage increases’ (Garnero 2017). According to this 
source, 10 per cent of workers, on average, are paid one-fifth less than the 
reference minimum wage, with peaks of 30 per cent in agriculture and 20 
per cent in hotels and restaurants, SMEs, in southern Italy, and among 
women and casual workers.  
The proportion of national sectoral wages covered by collective 
bargaining stands at about 88 per cent in the private sector and over 90 
per cent in the public sector. The remainder is variously composed of 
collectively or individually negotiated pay (restricted wage gap) and/or 
other elements, such as overtime pay (Fondazione Di Vittorio 2016). 
The second level of collective bargaining can be company-based or, 
alternatively, territorial (common in sectors in which very small enterprises 
or casual work are prevalent). Its aim is to respond to and stimulate 
corporate flexibility and competitiveness. It is not compulsory but rather 
facultative and usually depends on the presence of unionised works 
councils. Since the national industry-wide agreement sets minimum pay 
levels, taking into account only purchasing power, at company level pay 
rises – in the form of variable remuneration – depend on performance-
related indicators (productivity, profitability, quality, attendance). 
Productivity in particular, the Achilles heel of the whole economic system, 
is assumed to be the driver of any attempt to promote economic 
development. Since 2007, a number of laws and decrees have been 
promulgated in an effort to promote performance-related wage increases, 
with the introduction of some tax concessions to support company-level 
bargaining (see below, § 7) 
With regard to the actors concerned, national negotiations are 
conducted by the sectoral social partner federations, while the firm level is 
the prerogative of the unitary union representative body (Rappresentanze 
sindacali unitarie or RSU). In the recent past, the RSU has been 
complemented by the territorial sectoral unions, signatories of the higher-
level agreement in force in the company, to confer stronger vertical and 
infra-associational coherence on the two-tier system. The RSU, whose 
members are elected by members and non-members, is the single channel 
of workplace representation and may be elected in companies with over 15 
workers.  
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3. What kind of decentralisation? Challenges and 
changes from 2009 to 2014. 
Over the years, the Italian collective bargaining system, although 
theoretically well designed in the 1993 framework agreement, has 
encountered practical limits, as well as significant criticism. The growth of 
productivity and wages, which largely depend on company-level 
bargaining, have suffered from the failure of the latter to take off. The 
paucity of statutory norms with regard to social partner representativeness 
and collective bargaining effects has paved the way for uncertainty and 
bitter disputes, including before the courts. Union representativeness has 
become a thorny issue as relations between the major confederations have 
worsened over the years, following the enforcement of a number of key 
agreements despite the fact that a majority of would-be signatories did not 
back them.9 Another difficult issue has been collective bargaining 
decentralisation. Moving on from the archetypical ‘organised 
decentralisation’ designed in 1993, we have entered a phase of rapid 
changes, aimed – to various degrees and through different processes – at 
strengthening the decentralisation of collective bargaining. The major 
changes occurred from 2009, a year after the international financial crisis 
commenced. Schematically, the timeline of the major changes (presented 
below) has been non-linear (Leonardi and Sanna 2015):  
1. Weakly organised: the Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of 
Collective Bargaining (2009); 
2. Totally disorganised:  
– from the bottom, the Fiat model (2009–2010); 
– from the top, Article 8 of Act. 148 (legal reform adopted just after 
the ECB request to the Italian government (2011);  
3. Organised decentralisation: the three inter-confederal agreements on 
representativeness and bargaining (2011, 2013, 2014). 
3.1 Weakly organised: the Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of 
Collective Bargaining of 22 January 2009. 
On 22 January 2009, a Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of 
Collective Bargaining was signed by the government and the social 
partners. CGIL did not participate, however, due to its opposition to a 
number of clauses related to decentralisation and industrial unrest. This 
                                                             
9 This occurred with the tripartite agreements on the labour market (2001) and the collective 
bargaining system (2009); in some important industry-wide agreements, such as the tertiary 
and metalworking sectors (2008–2010); and at company level, in some big companies, such 
as FIAT (2010). In all these cases, CGIL and its federations were cut out of the deal.  
 
ITALIAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AT A TURNING POINT 11 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 139/2017 
was followed by an inter-confederal agreement signed with only 
Confindustria, in April of the same year (and again without CGIL), which 
introduced a number of changes to the system in force since 1993 (Bellardi 
2010). The new rules safeguarded the two-level structure of collective 
bargaining, with the provisions of sectoral collective agreements continuing 
to serve as a minimum nationwide threshold within the sector, but with the 
aim of empowering the second level of collective bargaining. The duration 
of sectoral agreements has been harmonised at three years for both 
normative and economic parts (previously, durations were four and two 
years, respectively). A new Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
replaces the old ‘foreseen inflation rate’, fixed through tripartite 
concertation, as was previously the case. Unlike in the past, the restoration 
of purchasing power will not be full, since the new indicator excludes 
imported energy costs. The gap between forecasted and real inflation will 
be taken into account only if it is deemed ‘significant’ at inter-confederate, 
not sectoral level. With a view to including workers not covered by 
company-level bargaining, the sectoral agreement will set a guaranteed 
minimum increase, just for them. Decentralised agreements are to last 
three years (previously four), covering topics defined by sectoral 
agreements or legislation and which did not concern those already 
regulated at other bargaining levels.  
One achievement of the 2009 agreements was an incremental 
strengthening of second-level bargaining, at company level. The 
agreement adopted changes implying the unprecedented possibility to 
introduce opening clauses, allowing deviations from national agreements. 
This was probably the most controversial aspect of the new system and 
the reason why CGIL refused to sign. Until then, derogations in pejus were 
allowed only exceptionally in territorial pacts in order to cope with 
economic underdevelopment and/or a high level of undeclared work. In 
any case, they were hardly ever put into practice. 
Although not signed by the largest trade union confederation, the 2009 
agreement did not prevent unions from renewing all industry-wide 
agreements in a unitary way in the following years. The glaring exceptions 
were the national agreements in two very important sectors – trade and 
metalworking, accounting for five million workers – from which the CGIL 
federations were left out. 
3.2 Totally disorganised: the ‘corporatisation’ of the FIAT/FCA 
model.  
At company level, the most controversial instances, as they concerned 
the country’s most important private employer, were some agreements 
signed at FIAT plants in 2009 and 2010. The company left the national 
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employers’ association and its stratified system of agreements to sign a 
new, unprecedented first-level agreement, de-linked from the 
metalworking industry-wide agreement. The agreements were signed by 
the CISL and UIL sectoral federations (FIM and UILM), and not by CGIL’s 
(FIOM). This new system recognises union representation with regard to 
the signatory organisations only (no matter how many members they have 
or the number of votes they received). Unions that refuse to sign firm-level 
agreements – such as the historical FIOM-CGIL – are excluded from 
representation within the workplace. Through a sort of closed shop, it is 
not the unions’ real representativeness (by votes and/or members) that 
enables them to sign collective agreements but, on the contrary, their 
willingness to sign agreements that cause signatory unions to be 
recognised by the company. In order to guarantee full enforceability and 
effectiveness of the agreements, and to prevent all possible forms of 
workers/unions dissent, a more binding limitation of the right to strike was 
introduced, with sanctions for unions and for individual workers (even 
dismissal) in case of violation of the peace clause. Last but not least, FIAT 
management convened a workers’ referendum on the new system, which 
also included several changes to working time and shifts, holding over 
them the threat that they would close plants (Pomigliano and Mirafiori) if 
a ‘no’ vote prevailed, transferring production to Poland. Under such 
pressure, the workers voted in favour of the new system by a slight 
majority. The dispute paved the way for a harsh period of conflicts and 
reciprocal accusations within the national trade union movement. Since 
then, FIOM-CGIL has campaigned unceasingly against the new model, 
registering a number of successes at the case law level, leading up to a 
final ruling by the Constitutional Court (Sent. no. 231/2013), which 
denounced the FIAT/FCA system as unconstitutional. This implies that a 
comprehensive law, embodying democratic and transparent rules on 
representation and bargaining outcomes, is needed.  
The FIAT/FCA case is still the only meaningful example of a company-
level agreement was signed that fully substituted, rather than merely 
complementing the industry-wide agreement. For that reason, it is 
considered very controversial and potentially destabilising for the whole 
system by many Italian labour lawyers, who consider this case to be a risky 
template for the total ‘corporatisation’ and even ‘Americanisation’ of the 
system.10 
 
                                                             
10 Among others, Bavaro (2012) and Romeo (2014). 
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3.3 Decentralisation under ‘New European Economic Governance’: 
Article 8, Law No. 148/2011. 
In the summer of 2011, amidst the turmoil in the financial markets 
Italy’s economic situation seemed to worsen. The Berlusconi government 
was weakened by internal cleavages and mistrusted by financial markets 
and European institutions alike. Private foreign capital withdrew and the 
country seemed to be in need of an IMF intervention. At that moment the 
country was perhaps the main concern of European policy-makers. Then, 
on 5 August 2011, a ’secret’ ECB letter asked the Italian government to 
reform (i) the pension system, in particular the eligibility criteria for 
seniority pensions and the retirement age for women; (ii) the labour 
market, making it easier to dismiss individual employees; and (iii) 
collective bargaining, allowing firm-level agreements to tailor wages and 
working conditions to individual firms’ specific needs. Clearly, despite the 
many and deep changes already introduced, the narrative from the EU 
institutions was that these changes had been insufficient. In their view, 
collectively agreed wages in Italy are over-centralised and insufficiently 
responsive to labour market conditions and firms’ capacity to pay, with 
secondary-level bargaining insufficiently developed.  
In a few months, the Parliament approved an austerity package, 
including all the measures that ‘Europe’ had requested. As a result the role 
of social dialogue was completely marginalised. The social partners were 
barely consulted and their opinions hardly considered. Surprisingly, social 
mobilisation and unrest remained far below what might have been 
expected; for instance, there was just a three-hour strike over the reform 
of the pension system that postponed the retirement age.  
Article 8 of Law Decree No. 138 of 12 August 2011 (converted into Law 
No. 148/2011 by means of a vote of confidence), entitled ‘Support for 
proximity collective bargaining’, was the Italian government’s immediate 
answer of the ECB’s letter (Garilli 2012; Chieco 2015). Indifferent to the 
willingness already expressed by the most representative social partners, 
the inter-confederal agreement having been signed just a few weeks 
previously (28 June), the government introduced the possibility for ‘specific 
agreements’ signed at company or territorial level to deviate from the law 
and national industry-wide collective agreements. Such derogating 
agreements must be formally justified in terms of the following: increasing 
employment; managing industrial and economic crisis; improving the 
quality of employment contracts; increasing productivity, competitiveness 
and pay; encouraging new investments and starting new activities; 
enhancing workers’ participation; or putting a stop to illegal labour. The 
range of topics with regard to which opting out is now possible is very large 
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and includes working time, the introduction of new technologies, changes 
in work organisation, job classification and tasks, fixed-term and part-time 
contracts, temporary agency work, transformation and conversion of 
employment contracts, hiring and firing procedures and the consequences 
of the termination of the employment relationship. Exceptions are related 
to ‘fundamental rights’, in conformity with the Italian Constitution and 
international norms and requirements (union rights, discriminatory 
dismissal, pensions).  
For the first time in Italy a national law has established, for the private 
sector, that company or territorial collective agreements shall have a 
binding effect ‘on all the workers concerned’, if they are signed by the 
‘trade union organisations operating in the company following existing laws 
and inter-confederal agreements’. With such a clause, Article 8 should at 
least avoid the promotion by employers of fictitious or ‘yellow’ 
representatives with the sole aim of eluding regular collective agreements. 
The new proximity agreements become valid and binding for all employees 
concerned if approved by a majority of union organisations, based on the 
abovementioned rules.  
Decentralised bargaining, in the intention of the lawmaker, is supposed 
to become the new core of the whole system, with the industry-wide level, 
in turn, relegated to a more or less residual role. Broadly denounced and 
stigmatised by most trade unionists and scholars, as a result of Article 8, 
derogations, which previously were exceptional, would become the norm, 
reversing the traditional hierarchy in labour law (Perulli and Speziale 2011; 
Bavaro 2012; Gottardi 2016). 
3.4 Coordinated decentralisation: the inter-confederal agreements 
on representativeness and bargaining 2011–2014. 
Meanwhile, on 28 June 2011, Confindustria and the three main union 
confederations (CGIL included this time), signed an inter-confederal 
agreement, with a double purpose: (i) defining measurable criteria for 
union representativeness and the bindingness of company agreements; (ii) 
enhancing collective bargaining decentralisation, with the possibility of 
opening clauses at company level, but in the framework established by the 
primary, national level.  
In a general climate of uncertainty and national worries about 
economic turmoil – with a request from the EU institutions in the air – the 
Italian social partners made a first attempt to self-reform the system, 
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before the government could pre-empt them, aware of what had just 
happened in Spain.11 As we have seen, it was wishful thinking.  
The terms of the 28 June agreement were confirmed repeatedly: first, 
in September 2011, in reaction to the unwelcome and unilateral 
intervention of the law, in the form of Article 8. Afterwards, on 31 May 
2013 and on 10 January 2014, the signatory parties returned to the issues 
of the first agreement of 2011, specifying its operationalisation in detail 
(Carinci 2013; Zoppoli 2014; Bavaro 2014; Barbera and Perulli 2014). The 
text of 10 January 2014 was supposed to be a new inclusive text on the 
whole subject of union representativeness and collective bargaining.12 
Other sectors and associations, after Confindustria, beat the same path, 
signing similar agreements on trade, cooperatives and services with the 
social partners.13 
In order to be considered sufficiently representative, and so admitted 
to national collective bargaining, trade union associations need to pass a 5 
per cent threshold. It is calculated as a simple average of the votes 
obtained at the works council elections and branch members, collected and 
certified by the National Institute for Social Protection. A sectoral 
agreement is binding if signed by the unions representing least 50 per cent 
+ 1 of the workforce and – importantly – after a ‘certified consultation’ of 
the workers, if approved by a simple majority of votes.  
At company level, the normal employees’ representative body is the 
abovementioned RSU. Its elections can be contested by electoral lists 
presented by trade union organisations adhering to the associations that 
have signed the framework or sectoral agreement at the company, or even 
others, on condition they accept the rules and obtain a minimum number 
of signatures among the workers. A company agreement will be valid and 
binding if approved by the majority of RSU members. For companies with 
rappresentanze sindacali aziendali (RSA), designated by the unions and not 
elected by all the employees, a firm agreement will be binding for all if 
approved by the majority of RSA members. In this case, the draft 
agreement can be subject to a referendum if at least one of the 
organisations signing the inter-confederal agreement, or at least 30 per 
cent of workers in the company, request it within ten days of the signing 
of the agreement.  
                                                             
11 During those weeks, in fact, the Spanish government had interrupted social dialogue, 
intervening unilaterally in bargaining decentralisation. 
12 Testo Unico su rappresentanza e contrattazione collettiva. 
13 There were a few differences and amendments concerning the specific criteria for defining 
representativeness and secondary-level bargaining, considering that in branches with many 
SMEs and casual workers, works councils may cover only a small proportion of employees. 
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It is worth underlining that at both levels representative democracy 
and the majoritarian principle are supplemented by direct democracy and 
referendums.  
Once approved in accordance with such a procedure, again at both 
levels, the dissenting signatory organisations are barred from taking 
industrial action if they are in a minority. Through intra-associational 
coordination, the signatory parties have to exert influence over their 
affiliates in order to make the agreement fully enforceable and binding. 
Cool-down procedures, established at sectoral level, should prevent and 
sanction any behaviour that might compromise the enforceability and 
efficacy of signed agreements. 
As regards coordination between national- and company-level 
bargaining, the primacy of the former is explicitly confirmed, although 
there is a possibility to negotiate ‘modifying agreements’ at company level, 
albeit subject to coordination and in accordance with parameters and 
procedural limits laid down in the national agreement. Collective bargaining 
at company level takes place with regard to matters delegated and in the 
manner defined by the national collective agreement in the sector or by 
law. External unions can be involved in managing situations of crisis and 
restructuring, where some deviations from the higher level of bargaining 
might be required temporarily. Unlike in the case of Article 8 – and this is 
a very important difference – derogations from statutory norms are not 
permitted.  
4. Recent trends in collective bargaining. 
To date, the outcomes of the new system laid down in the inter-
confederal agreements of 2011–2014 have not been satisfying, and the 
new rounds of negotiations in 2015–2017 have not benefitted. In an 
entirely voluntary system, the data-gathering process has turned out to be 
fraught, with major difficulties due mainly to the reluctance of many 
enterprises to provide the required information to the institutes in charge 
of processing membership data.  
The issue of signatory representativeness, not defined by any law, is 
the Achilles’ heel of the whole system. It not only affects the trade union 
side, where in fact it has been a cause of severe disputes, but also the 
employers’ associations, whose acute fragmentation continues to be one 
of the most serious weaknesses of the Italian industrial relations system. 
Individual companies (FIAT was by far the most famous case), groups of 
enterprises or branches (such as in the area of hypermarkets and small 
and medium-sized enterprises) have chosen to exit from their respective 
trade associations, to create their own new contractual units (Bellardi 
2016; Papa 2016). The fragmentation and uncertain representativeness of 
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the employers' associations raise the need to establish transparent and 
certified parameters, even on this side, with regard to the total number of 
members and workers. So-called ‘pirate’ agreements, signed by unknown 
or ambiguous associations, are undermining the whole system of collective 
bargaining ‘from the top’, fostering fraudulent strategies and downward 
contractual dumping. The cost gap between a national agreement signed 
by the most representative unions and one signed by others – in the same 
contractual unit – can be several thousand euros a year and with lower pay 
rates (by up to 20 per cent), which is dumping by any estimation. The 
downward pressure on contractual terms has led the major social partners 
to moderate wage dynamics in order to limit the adoption of smaller 
contracts by businesses (D’Amuri and Nizzi 2017)  
4.1 Recent renewals of national industry-wide agreements. 
According to the CNEL archive, in 2008 some 396 industry-wide 
agreements were recorded, of which fewer than 300 were endorsed by the 
large and most representative confederations; at the end of 2016 that 
figure had risen to a striking 803 (Olini 2016), only 225 of which were 
signed by the sectoral federations affiliated to the three main 
confederations. A striking 195 were in the commerce sector only, 60 in 
transport and an average of 30 in the other main branches: metal, 
chemical, food, textile, banking and services. Some of them are nothing 
but ‘copy and paste’ agreements, but most were conceived with the 
express purpose of driving down costs and labour standards.  
 
Figure 1 Number of national industry-wide agreements submitted to the National Council of 
the Economy and Labour (CNEL), Italy 
 
 
 
Source: CNEL, Notiziario dell’Archivio contratti, No. 23, October 2016. 
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In the period 2012–2015, the renewal period for workers whose 
contract has expired was, on average, 24 months (ADAPT 2017); in 2016–
2017, this was increased to 26 months. Strikes were recorded in eight 
cases.  
Between September 2016 and April 2017, over 50 industry-wide 
agreements – affecting 7 million workers (55 per cent of the total) – were 
renewed by the most representative social partner associations. As of May 
2017, 42 national agreements, concerning 5.8 million workers – 45 per 
cent of those concerned – were still pending, 15 of them in the public sector 
(2.9 million employees). After a seven-year freeze – censured by the 
Constitutional Court – bargaining is once again under way for the renewal 
of the nationwide agreement covering 3 million public workers.  
Nominal wage increases have been scheduled, in two or three 
tranches, by all the agreements. Amounts differ considerably from sector 
to sector, but on average they are fairly low once more: 0.8 per cent, 
according to the Bank of Italy (2017a). Some of them have frozen 
immediate increases, prolonging agreement duration to over three years. 
Others (trade and crafts) have abandoned the link to the Harmonised 
Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP), giving the negotiating actors more 
room to manoeuvre. They all refer an ex ante calibration, as in the past, 
with the important exception of the metalworking renewal, where the real 
wage dynamic will be calculated and restored ex post, every year in June, 
after the official data on current inflation are delivered by the National 
Institute of Statistics.  
A monitoring study by ADAPT (2017) of a representative sample of 
texts shows that, after wages, labour market and industrial relations are 
dealt with in all sectoral agreements. The national agreements reaffirm the 
two-tier system, national and company (or alternatively territorial), 
according to the principle of delegation and non-repeatability of individual 
contractual items and with a substantial alignment with the coordination 
and specialisation rules defined in inter-confederal agreements, which are 
authoritative in this respect. 
Among recent trends, we would like to underline the growing weight 
of ‘bilateralism’: the social partners’ management of occupational welfare, 
through joint bodies and funds. Encouraged by the legislation to provide a 
stop-gap in the context of welfare state retrenchment, bilateral funds have 
been established in all sectors. Funded by enterprises, they provide 
complementary pension schemes, supplementary health insurance and 
unemployment benefits. For a system traditionally lacking a strong 
participatory model in industrial relations, bilateralism can be considered 
the most structured and effective form of participation (Leonardi 2017). 
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4.2 Coverage and contents of secondary-level collective 
bargaining. 
Unlike other countries, where all collective agreements are collected 
and archived in public observatories – making fairly precise data available 
– Italy has nothing of the kind, only sample-based surveys or 
observatories. However, they all agree that decentralised bargaining is 
very limited, given the number of enterprises and workers covered. 
According to the Banca d’Italia, company-level bargaining in the private 
sector covers the 20 per cent of enterprises with more than 20 employees 
(D’Amuri and Giorgiantonio 2014; Cardinaleschi 2016; ISTAT 2016; Banca 
d’Italia 2017). The outcomes presented in ISTAT data and their elaboration 
by the Fondazione Di Vittorio (2016) are similar. Here, secondary-level 
bargaining coverage, summing the territorial and company levels, is 
estimated to involve approximately 20 per cent (21.2 per cent) of firms 
with more than 10 employees, 13 per cent by firm-level agreements and 
the rest (8.2 per cent) by territorial agreements. 
 
 
Figure 2 Companies covered by secondary-level collective bargaining, company or territorial 
 
 
 
The cross-sectoral gap is remarkable, with a fork between the 43 per 
cent of the industrial sector and the 25.8 per cent of construction, with a 
mere 5 per cent at company level.  
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Figure 3 Private sector employees estimated to be covered by secondary-level bargaining, 
total and by sectors, Italy, 2014 
 
 
 
 
However, the data show a strong territorial polarisation, with a higher 
concentration in the most economically developed Northern regions, and a 
substantial absence which affects the Southern regions and the two big 
islands, where the coverage ratio falls to 11–13 per cent of firms, of which 
only 5.7–7.7 per cent are covered by a company-level agreement. 
Predictably, firm size matters,14 so that there is a strong and clear co-
relationship between firm size and bargaining propensity. The spread of 
firm-level agreements is much higher in large companies, such as those 
with over 200 employees (60.5 per cent, 56.6 per cent of which at firm 
level) or over 500 employees (69 per cent, with 65.5 per cent at firm level). 
It is lower in the other size classes, namely between 50 and 199 workers, 
where 38.5 per cent are covered, and between 10 and 49 employees, 
                                                             
14 In Italy, firms under 49 employees represent 98 per cent of all companies, giving 
employment to 52 per cent of all employees; 93.7 per cent have fewer than 16 employees; 
88 per cent fewer than five. At the other extreme, companies with 500 employees or more 
represent only 0.1 per cent of enterprises, but account for almost 25 per cent of overall 
employment.  
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covering 17.5 per cent, split equally between company and territorial 
agreements. The total proportion of employees covered by a secondary-
level agreement in the private sector is approximatively 35 per cent, or 3.7 
million workers (Fondazione Di Vittorio, 2016). Other studies reach similar 
conclusions, according to which between 70 and 75 per cent of Italian 
wage-earners are excluded by any form of secondary-level bargaining. 
Wages are ‘condemned’ never to increase but merely to remain aligned, at 
best, with the real value they enjoyed when the system was established, 
in July 1993 (Tronti, 2016)  
According to our calculations, the figures on the coverage of company-
level bargaining and workplace representation overlap. According to 
institutional sources (CNEL-ISTAT 2015), elected works councils (RSU) 
operate in a mere 12 per cent of enterprises. The figure is slightly higher 
if one includes the other possible form of workplace representation, 
designated by the unions and not elected by employees (RSA), prevalent 
in the financial sector. The presence is as low as 8 per cent in companies 
employing fewer than 50 employees. The majority of companies (60 per 
cent) with more than 500 employees have a works council (Pellegrini 
2017). This is certainly one of the main explanations, perhaps the most 
important, for the very limited extension of company-level bargaining and 
agreements (Leonardi 2016).  
 
Figure 4 Companies covered by territorial or firm-level bargaining and works councils (by size 
and in %) 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CNEL-ISTAT data referring to 2012–2015. 
8,7 6,6
3,9 3,6
8,38,8
31,9
56,6
65,5
12,9
7,5
34,7
58,8
61,5
12,1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
10-49 50-200 200-500 500+ Totale
Territorial CB Firm CB Workplace Representation
22 SALVO LEONARDI  - MARIA CONCETTA AMBRA  - ANDREA CIARINI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 139/2017 
If this is not an encouraging picture in terms of coverage, what about 
the content of the company-level agreements? According to some surveys, 
in the period 2012–2016 the matter most commonly addressed was wages, 
present in 77 per cent of territorial and 64 per cent of company agreements 
(ADAPT, 2015; 2017). According to another study (OCSEL, 2017), 
restructuring was the most frequent issue in 2013–2014 (62 per cent of 
agreements), followed by wages (23 per cent). In 2015–2016, wages were 
addressed in 43 per cent and restructuring in 37 per cent of agreements. 
Working time flexibility is another frequent item, whereas occupational 
welfare has been gaining more and more attention in recent collective 
bargaining rounds, at all levels. A total of 20 per cent of new firm-level 
agreements include one or more items concerning in firm health insurance 
and a wide range of benefits concerning working life balance, smart 
working and company day care. This could be further developed, given the 
robust fiscal incentives given by the government for such arrangements in 
firm-level agreements. Finally, work organisation is tackled in 11 per cent 
of the sample – especially shift work – up from 6 per cent the previous 
year (OCSEL, 2017) 
It is important to underline here that disorganised decentralisation, 
with firm-level agreements used as an open alternative to sectoral ones, 
has not taken place. Empirical surveys all agree that derogating from 
sectoral agreements concerns probably between 5 and 10 per cent of 
company agreements (Tomassetti, 2015; OCSEL-CISL, 2016; Olini, 2016, 
ADAPT, 2017). Work organisation and working time are the most prevalent 
topics. This is good news, but we cannot completely exclude the possibility 
that the existence of derogating agreements is simply insufficiently known, 
as their signatory parties, on the union side, are not interested in 
publicising them (Imberti, 2013).  
5. Survey of the metalworking and trade sectors.  
5.1 The Italian metal industry in the aftermath of the crisis. 
A total of 1.6 million people work in the metal industry in Italy, one of 
the highest figures in Europe. Its added value in 2014 amounted to 113 
million euros, corresponding to 55.3 per cent of the Italian manufacturing 
sector’s gross value added (GVA). The bulk of this is concentrated in two 
sub-sectors: the manufacture of machinery and equipment (n.e.c.) and the 
manufacture of fabricated metal products, excluding machinery and 
equipment. The number of active enterprises registered in 2014 was 
196,507, representing 5.2 per cent of the total economy (excluding finance 
and insurance). As in many other European countries, the manufacturing 
sector in Italy has witnessed a constant decline in recent decades, in terms 
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of both companies and employment (see Figure 5). The economic crisis 
that started in 2008 aggravated this trend. Between 2008 and 2014 the 
workforce in the metal sector shrank by more than 324,000 (–12.5 per 
cent). Unlike the manufacturing sector, the metal industry is characterised 
by bigger than average enterprises. However, value added decreased 
steadily in the years of the crisis (see Figure 6). This trend had serious 
repercussions for both employment levels and labour productivity, which 
fell steadily compared with the European average.  
 
 
Figure 5 Employment trends in the metal industry and manufacturing sector in Italy, NACE 
Rev. 2, 2008–2014 (‘000) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
Figure 6 Gross value added at basic prices, 2005 and 2015 (% share of total gross value 
added) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat - Economy and finance. National accounts and GDP.  
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5.1.1. The metal industry in Italian industrial relations. Structure 
and actors. 
Union density in the Italian metal sector is 32.8, slightly higher 
than that of the manufacturing sector (31.4 per cent) and a bit below the 
– estimated – national average of 33.4 per cent (Carrieri and Feltrin 2016). 
The most representative sectoral unions are FIOM-CGIL, FIM-CISL and 
UILM-UIL. Employer density is estimated at around 50 per cent, with a 
number of employers’ associations. The largest and most influential of the 
latter is Federmeccanica (affiliated to Confindustria), with more than 
16,000 enterprises, employing 800,000 workers. The second is 
Unionmeccanica (affiliated to Confapi), representing 80,000 small and 
medium-sized enterprises, employing 800,000 workers, with 400,000 in 
the metal sector proper). Cooperatives and craft industry have their own 
confederations and sectoral federations, also in metalworking. In 2013, a 
new breakaway employers’ confederation – Confimi Industria – was 
founded by local and sectoral employers’ associations from Confapi and 
Confindustria.  
The whole metal industry is covered by five main national collective 
agreements, all signed by the same unions with the various employers’ 
associations, depending on firm size and economic subsector: large 
industry, small and medium, cooperatives, craft and goldsmiths' wares. To 
date, all the main national collective agreements have been renewed. Only 
the craft sector has not yet renewed its collective agreement.  
Since 1993 collective bargaining has taken place at two levels in Italy. 
The two-tier bargaining system is based on industry-wide agreements. In 
recent years trade unions have reinforced the role of second-level 
bargaining with the aim of increasing flexibility and productivity. In general 
terms the Italian two-tier bargaining system is made up of high minimum 
wages negotiated in collective agreements and a relatively compressed 
wage scale (Garnero 2017). The estimated sectoral Kaitz index15 in the 
metal industry (78.3 per cent) is slightly lower than in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole (79.88 per cent). A high sectoral Kaitz index corresponds 
to a substantial number of workers being paid at the minimum wage level, 
with a very narrow distribution. Alternatively, it may indicate a large 
number of low paid workers below the minimum wage.  
 
 
  
                                                             
15 The level of the minimum wage compared with the median wage. 
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Table 3 Minimum wage and Kaitz index  
 
 Annual 
minimum  
wage 
Annual 
average 
wage 
Monthly 
minimum 
wage 
Kaitz 
sectoral 
index 
(percentage 
of median in 
sector) 
Metal sector 
Kaitz sectoral 
index 
(percentage 
of median in 
sector) 
Manufacturing  
Metal 
sector 
 
16,888.43 
euros  
21,566.22 
euros 
1,297.81 
euros 
78.3 79.9 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Garnero (2017) and union documentation. 
 
 
As reported by Armaroli, Spattini and Tomassetti (2017), pay 
negotiations in metalworking have, in most cases, been characterised by 
wage moderation. This trend is confirmed if we look at the metal industry 
wage share (Figure 7). Despite a steady increase after the recession that 
started in 2008 this ratio is still far below the pre-crisis level.  
 
 
Figure 7 Metal industry wage share, 2008–2015 (%) 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on business statistics – Eurostat data. 
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decentralised agreements in Italy. Approximately 35 per cent of employees 
in the private sector are covered by a second level agreement represent, 
equivalent to 3.7 million workers (Fondazione Di Vittorio, 2016). In smaller 
enterprises, most employees are not covered by any workplace 
representation with the consequence that company level bargaining is 
limited. Due to the higher number of companies in the metal sector with 
more than 250 employees, second-level bargaining has a higher incidence 
there than in the rest of the economy. In order to improve flexibility and 
productivity decentralised and territorial-level bargaining have been 
strengthened in the past two years, by focusing on company welfare 
agreements. The new national industry-wide agreement is fairly 
representative of this new trend.  
5.1.2 The most recent national industry-wide agreement. 
Negotiations on the new national industry-wide agreement were 
difficult and protracted, taking more than one year. The last two renewals 
had been signed without FIOM-CGIL and there was a risk, at the beginning, 
of a similar outcome. Confindustria and its affiliate (Federmeccanica) 
demanded more collective bargaining decentralisation towards the firm 
level in wage setting. In the metal sector, the biggest company, FIAT, left 
Federmeccanica and Confindustria in 2009, so as to overcome what it 
regards as the ‘rigidities’ of the collective bargaining system and to 
implement its own establishment-level contract. 
In 2015, metalworker federations presented two platforms to the 
employers’ federation: one FIM-UILM and another FIOM. In the end, they 
were brought together. Federmeccanica presented its own platform, called 
the ‘renovation of the metalworkers’ national collective agreement’, calling 
for just one level of negotiation and a national guaranteed wage only for 
those uncovered by any collective or individual enterprise CLA (covering 
just 5 per cent of metalworkers), its amount to be defined every year. 
Nothing happened in 2016 because wage rises already exceeded real 
expected inflation. In July 2017 wages are set to be increased based on 
the previous year’s inflation; 260 euros per year as a production bonus or 
welfare vouchers; an increase in health coverage insurance; permanent 
training lasting 24 hours every three years; and an increase in 
supplementary pension. 
At the end of difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached in 
November 2016 with all the most representative trade unions, and signed 
after the workers approved the draft in a ballot.  
Compared with the past, the new agreement provides considerable 
novelty.  
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– Duration: unlike what had been foreseen in the collective bargaining 
reform of 2009, the parties agreed to extend the contract from three to 
four years. 
– Wages: there was no planned wage increase for 2016, but there was a 
one-off sum of 80 euros (gross) in 2017 wages. As of 2017, a new 
inflation adjustment mechanism has been introduced, which is no longer 
based on expected inflation (on the basis of the foreseen or expected 
inflation rate) but defined every year ex post, and not ex ante, as in 
other sectoral agreements.  
– Occupational welfare, both at sectoral and company level, plays a key 
role in the new collective agreement. It consists of health insurance, 
training (24 hours every three years), complementary pensions and a 
wide range of benefits provided at company level through vouchers. As 
a consequence of the robust fiscal incentives instituted by the 
government these changes are expected to introduce substantial 
innovations with regard to relations between the social partners. New 
parameters and a different relationship between occupational welfare at 
company and at sectoral level have been established. Since 1 June 
2017, companies have been committed to providing flexible benefits for 
all workers up to a maximum of 100 euros in 2017, 150 euros in 2018 
and 200 euros in 2019. It must be said that the first real increase, in 
June 2017, was a pitiful 1.5 euros for a typical blue-collar worker. 
Likewise, supplementary pensions and supplementary health insurance 
have been extended to all workers. As an alternative to monetary 
bonuses, workers can opt – entirely or partly – for in-kind welfare 
services collectively bargained at company or territorial level. The new 
collective agreement gives a further boost to supplementary pension 
provision by increasing the contribution rate paid by companies in favour 
of employees who are members of the National Pension Fund (Cometa), 
from 1.2 to 2 per cent. As of 1 October 2017, the supplementary health 
insurance contribution to the sectoral health fund (Metasalute) will be 
fully borne by the employer, totalling 156 euros per year. The right to 
supplementary health care has been extended to part-time and fixed-
term workers, as well as to workers' dependent family members. In 
cases in which the company already provides forms of supplementary 
health care, the collective agreement stipulates that the parties will have 
to complement the benefits with a contribution to be paid by the 
company, which cannot be less than 156 euros per year. 
– Training: the contract focuses heavily on training and the individual right 
of all workers to choose training related to innovation (linguistic, 
technological and organisational, transversal or relational skills). This 
right is currently limited to 24 hours (or 16) over three years, after 
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which there is a 150-hour reinforcement and university training 
(security training and RLS are also strenghtned). 
– Participation: support for the direct participation, in different ways, of 
workers (observers and committees in second-tier negotiations and 
security), the establishment of a new participation advisory committee 
in larger companies (1,500 employees or so) and a national committee 
on active labour policies. 
Compared with the past, occupational welfare and benefits constitute 
a major novelty, seen as a way to stimulate labour productivity with no 
direct monetary increases. The flexible benefits included are additional, 
provided by second-tier negotiations, for all workers. This represents a 
novelty not only with regard to previous renewals, but also with regard to 
the FCA agreement. The FCA agreement has only one, corporate level. It 
provides the possibility of transforming or replacing part of variable 
remuneration into flexible benefits, to which the company adds a 5 per cent 
stake. The FCA's welfare plan is defined by agreement between the unions 
that are signatories to the collective agreement: FIM-CISL, UILM-UIL, 
FISMC, UGLM and ACQF, but not FIOM-CGIL. One of the strengths of the 
FCA's corporate welfare is the fact that it has built up a well-defined basket 
of services, with the unused welfare services re-absorbed in wages. The 
national collective agreement works on the basis of a different logic; it is 
not based on the exchange of services and variable parts of remuneration 
within the company, but on the coexistence of a national level entrusted 
with maintaining purchasing power and a second tier that is required to 
add additional welfare benefits. The vast majority of company agreements 
have been signed in larger companies, especially multinationals, with more 
than 1,000 employees, 39.7 per cent of the total (Mosca and Tomassetti 
2017). In fact, small and micro-enterprises, where flexible benefits cannot 
be generated by the economies of scale that are typical of larger 
companies, are somewhat worried. A second concern is related to the 
availability of data on the type of services and flexible benefits negotiated 
in companies. The data show a strong increase in corporate bargaining on 
the subject of welfare. However, the lack of more detailed information on 
the sectoral and corporate levels preclude comparisons of the different 
baskets. 
5.1.3 The trade union viewpoint. 
The metal workers unions have agreed to wage moderation and new 
participatory approach to collective-agreement and company welfare, 
rejecting the abandonment of the national collective agreement. In this 
exchange Italian metal unions have achieved an attenuation of the strong 
dualisation initially envisaged in the Federmeccanica proposals. Against 
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this background the trade unions reacted to these pressures by using the 
new contractual architecture as a tool for relaunching collective bargaining.  
Wages and labour costs were the most difficult topic during the long 
negotiations. As one national official of FIOM-CGIL told us16:  
 
At the beginning of the negotiations, employers not only did not accept the 
wage increases. In a situation of deflation (with both an economic downturn 
and falling inflation), [perversely] the [company] was actually asking the 
workers for money back. Enterprises were willing to grant wage increases only 
to those workers whose wage levels were lower than the minimum. This called 
into question the autonomy of the national and company levels. At the same 
time, Federmeccanica's proposal mentioned an integrative health care service 
borne by the company and the workers. We started from a difficult situation, 
within a legislative framework that had already created derogations, divisions 
amongst the workers and a weakening of the national collective agreement.  
 
Another official from the same organisation17 told us that the employers 
have certainly obtained the low wage increases:  
 
They also obtained a mechanism of total variability with regard to company 
welfare benefits. Previously when negotiating final agreements, you could 
bargain for fixed items for everyone. Now they have become variable. We 
worked on the fact that with occupational welfare we could recover what was 
lacking with regard to wages. We have extended integrative health care to 
everyone and made sure that, above all, this responsibility was borne by the 
enterprises. Federmeccanica wanted everything to be regulated within the 
company. We managed to get this in the collective agreement and give 
workers the opportunity to choose between corporate benefits and other 
forms of contractual welfare (health insurance and complementary pension).  
 
For the FIM-CISL, the focus must be on corporate and territorial 
negotiations. As we were told in an interview with a leader of the 
metalworkers federation18:  
 
We cannot continue with just the national one. If small enterprises alone 
cannot activate company welfare plans, it is necessary to reinforce territorial 
bargaining in order to build economies of scale, in order to activate services. 
It is also necessary to integrate bilateralism in this design: we have to put 
together parts of bilateralism in order to strengthen company welfare in small 
enterprises. That said, a step forward has been made after too many years of 
divisions. A step forward has been made with respect to Federmeccanica, 
which was demanding money back. Foundations have also been laid so that 
                                                             
16 Maurizio Landini, General Secretary of the FIOM-CGIL. 
17 Roberta Turi, member of the FIOM-CGIL national board. 
18 Marco Bentivogli, General Secretary of the FIM-CISL. 
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the workers can access more services and integrative benefits under the 
collective agreement. 
5.1.4 Final comments. 
The metalworkers unions have agreed on wage moderation and a new 
participatory approach to collective agreement–based and company 
welfare, rejecting the abandonment of the national collective agreement. 
In this exchange Italian metal unions have achieved an attenuation of the 
strong dualisation initially envisaged in the Federmeccanica proposals. 
Against this background trade unions have reacted to these pressures by 
using the new collective-agreement architecture as a means of relaunching 
collective bargaining. Although the new agreement does not grant 
significant wage increases, it continues to maintain purchasing power. 
Despite pressure towards disintermediation, the potential destabilisation 
induced by the FIAT/FCA case – with its company agreement as an 
alternative to the national industry-wide agreement – did not take place. 
From such a viewpoint, the sector has maintained a degree of inter-sectoral 
coordination, with the two traditional levels confirmed. The signatory social 
partners were able to establish some points, exploiting the innovations 
provided by the legislation. One point of criticism might be the difficulty 
that smaller companies are likely to experience in actually realising welfare 
benefits at plant level, especially the in-kind services that require 
considerable economies of scale. As matter of fact the development of 
company welfare in these companies depends on the ability of the social 
partners to reinforce territorial-level bargaining. 
5.2 The Italian trade sector after the economic crisis (2008–2014). 
5.2.1 Collective bargaining in the trade and retail sector19. 
Our aim in this section is to investigate the changes that occurred in 
the Italian trade sector from 2008 to 2014. First, we describe the main 
structural characteristics of the trade sector in Italy, focusing on the retail 
subsector. Then we analyse collective bargaining at national level, 
highlighting the main actors and processes in trade and retail. Finally, we 
take a more detailed look at decentralised collective bargaining in the trade 
sector (at company and territorial level) in order to understand its impact 
on wages, working conditions and social protection. 
                                                             
19 The trade sector (G) comprises three main subsectors: G45, wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; G46, wholesale trade, excluding motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; and G47, retail trade, excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles. The so-called 
GDO: Grande distribuzione organizzata (Large Distribution) is included in Retail (G47). We 
used the Eurostat Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (Nace Rev. 2 G) available 
from 2008 to 2014 (last update 18.05.17; extracted on 04.06.17). 
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5.2.2 Main structural characteristics of the trade sector in Italy: 
workers and firms. 
From 2008 to 2014, the economic crisis led to the closure of 91,908 
enterprises in the Italian trade sector as a whole (–8 per cent); more than 
57 per cent of this reduction (52,978 firms) was in the retail sector.  
 
 
Table 4 Enterprises in the trade sector, Italy, by economic activities (2008–2014) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2008/2014 
G45 122,951 120,850 119,348 119,070 118,220 116,895 115,256 -7,695 
-
6% 
G46 422,198 412,049 409,684 406,450 402,596 398,362 390,963 -31,235 
-
7% 
G47 669,893 651,024 644,873 646,623 642,597 638,383 616,915 -52,978 
-
8% 
G 1,215,042 1,183,923 1,173,905 1,172,143 1,163,413 1,153,640 1,123,134 -91,908 
-
8% 
 
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G).  
 
 
 
Most of the employment (about 97 per cent) is concentrated in firms with 
fewer than 10 employees (Table 5). 
 
 
 
Table 5 Number of enterprises in the trade sector, in Italy (G) by employment size, 2008/2014 
 
 2008 2014 
Total firms in trade sector (G) 1,215,042 100% 1,123,134 100% 
0–1 person employed 698,061 57% 658,581 59% 
2–9 476,193 39% 428,050 38% 
Total 0–9 1,174,254 96% 1,086,631 97% 
10–49 37,530 3% 33,508 3% 
50 or more 3,258 0% 2,995 0% 
 
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G). 
 
 
 
In 2014, the total number of persons working in the trade sector in 
Italy was 3,302,311. However, if you consider only employees, they 
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numbered 1,941,454, about 58 per cent of the whole. This falls further to 
1,502,830 if you consider full-time employees (Eurostat, 2016). 
 
 
Table 6 Workers in the trade sector, Italy, 2008–2014 
 
 2008 2014  2008/2014
Total working in sector  3,557,898 3,302,311  -255,587 -7% 
Number of employees 1,985,710 1,941,454  -44,256 -2% 
Number of full-time equivalent 
employees  
1,699,626 1,502,830 
 
-196,796 -12% 
 
 
 
Table 7 Workers in retail, Italy, 2008–2014 
  
  2008 2014  2008/2014 
Total of person employed  1,911,419 1,819,749  -91,670 -5% 
Number of employee 1,019,525 1,035,752  16,227 2% 
Number of employee in full time 
equivalent  
851,303 762,723 
 
-88,580 -10% 
 
Source: Eurostat Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (Nace Rev. 2 G).  
 
 
5.2.3 National collective bargaining in the trade sector: actors and 
processes. 
In the trade sector, there are three main trade union organisations: 
Filcams-CGIL, Fisascat-CISL and Uiltucs-UIL. These unions represent 
workers in the largest part of private services, including trade and retail, 
restaurants, hotels and cleaning. Their overall number is growing year after 
year. In 2014 these three trade unions (as a whole) had about 900,000 
members.20  
Nevertheless, union density in these sectors remains one of the lowest. 
Union density in the trade sector as a whole was about 17 per cent in 2014 
(Feltrin and Carrieri, 2016), lower than in all other sectors.21 However, it 
is growing, especially in large distribution multinational companies.22 
                                                             
20 According to trade union data, from 2008 to 2014 Filcams, Fisascat and Uitucs taken 
together increased their membership from about 674,426 to 900,993 (+33.6 per cent). Fiom, 
Fim and Uilm together increased from 654,237 to 655,781 members (+0.2 per cent). 
21 According to Visser (2015) union density in Italy was 37.3 per cent in 2013. It is still 
growing. According to our calculations based on Italian union data and Istat data, in 2014 
union density in Italy reached 37.7 per cent.  
22 According to union data, in 2014 almost 900,000 workers were members of Filcams, 
Fisascat or Uiltucs. According to Istat data, in 2014 about 2,800,000 workers 15–64 years of 
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There are four main employers’ organisations in the trade sector and 
retail: 
(i) Confcommercio; (ii) Confesercenti; (iii) so-called ‘cooperative 
distribution’; and (iv) Federdistribuzione,23 representing ‘modern 
distribution companies’.  
Confcommercio declares that it has more than 700,000 affiliated firms 
and almost 2.7 million employees; Confesercenti claims to represent 
around 350,000 SMEs with more than 1,000,000 employees. According to 
the last Federdistribuzione data, they represent about 200 large companies 
and multinationals (such as Carrefour, Auchan, Esselunga, Ikea and so on), 
with more than 220,000 employees. The problem is that every employer 
association collects and spread its own data. There does not exist, as in 
the French case, a law that establishes the criteria to follow to measure the 
representativeness not only of trade union but also of employer 
organisations. 
 
Until 2011, Federdistribuzione was part of Confcommercio; in 2012, they 
split. 
 
An influential trade unionist underlined that ‘the split of Federdistribuzione 
from Confcommercio occurred after or is somehow linked to Law Decree 
201/2011 on liberalisation. Confcommercio has its critics, even though not 
contrary. Federdistribuzione instead supported liberalisation. This means not 
only the possibility to keep shops open 24 hours a day but also the possibility 
of opening new outlets by loosening the criteria established by regions and 
provinces. [Gabrielli, Filcams CGIL General Secretary] 
 
Such employer segmentation affects the number of national collective 
agreements in the trade sector. The following are the main agreements 
signed (or under negotiation) by Filcams CGIL, Fisascat CISL and Uiltucs: 
– The national collective agreement for Tertiary, Distribution and 
Services (TDS) with Confcommercio, last renewed in March 2015 (it 
will expire on December 2017). 
– The national collective agreement signed with Confesercenti, renewed 
in July 2016. 
                                                             
age were employed in the trade sector (G), and in hotels and restaurants (I). For this reason 
union density in trade, hotel and restaurant sectors (g-i) in 2014 cannot be higher than 32.1 
per cent. This is an overestimation, since we do not know how many workers, who are union 
members, are working in other sectors (for instance, as cleaners).  
23 Federdistribuzione is an umbrella association of five further associations: (i) ADA, 
Associazione Distributori associate; (ii) ADIS, Associazione Distribuzione Ingrosso e self-
services; (iii) AIRAI, Associazioni Imprese Retailers Alimentare; (iv) ANCIDIS, Associazione 
Nazionale Commercio Imprenditoriale al Dettaglio e Imprese Specializzate Non Food; and (v) 
Federdistribuzione Franchising. 
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– The national collective agreement in cooperative distribution (expired 
in 2013). 
– Ongoing negotiation for first national agreement with 
Federdistribuzione. 
 
The national collective agreement with Confcommercio, last renewed in 
March 2015, will expire on December 2017. This national agreement was 
the first jointly signed by all three most representative unions CGIL, CISL 
and UIL, since Filcmas CGIL refused to sign the previous two, in 2008 and 
2011. According to Uiltucs data, it covers about 1.2 million workers.  
 
The national collective agreement signed with Confesercenti in July 2016 
is quite similar to the Confcommercio national agreement. One novelty is 
the possibility to adopt a new type of ‘temporary contract’. This agreement 
allows companies located in tourist places derogations on the limits set by 
national collective bargaining. According to Uiltucs, it cover about 50,000 
workers. 
 
From a normative and economic point of view, national agreements in the 
trade sector (with Confcommercio and Confesercenti) are essentially identical. 
Furthermore, each collective agreement has its own bilateral and autonomous 
system. (Gabrielli, Filcams-CGIL General Secretary) 
 
The national collective agreement in cooperative distribution expired in 
2013 and negotiations are still ongoing.24 Unions in the past were able to 
exchange more favourable waging conditions and career development in 
exchange for labour cost cuts. Cooperative work in Italy can take 
advantage of the statutory public tax credit to foster the development of 
cooperative work. 
 
Compared with the agreements with Confcommercio and Confesercenti, the 
national agreement for cooperative distribution has slightly higher wages, as it 
establishes better career paths for workers. (M.G. Gabrielli, Filcams CGIL General 
Secretary)  
Nevertheless, negotiations to renew this national agreement are still under 
way. According to the Uiltucs national secretary, this national agreement 
will cover about 80,000 workers. 
 
                                                             
24 The three national associations still negotiating the renewal are: ANCC Coop, the National 
Association of Consumer Coop; Confcooperative; and Agci Agrital.  
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In recent years cooperative distribution has pushed for reductions in wages 
and labor costs in order to be more competitive than other private (and non-
coop) firms. (Marroni and Uiltucs National Secretary) 
 
Also still open are the negotiations on the national agreement with 
Federdistribuzione, which covers about 220,000 employees. The situation 
is now fraught, due to a halt in negotiations. In the words of an official of 
Filcams CGIL:  
 
At the beginning, there were different approaches. Fisascat CISL was more 
inclined to negotiate with Federdistribuzione, while Uiltucs was more hostile 
because of its historically stronger relationships with Confcommercio. We, 
CGIL, have opened a negotiation in a coordinated way by presenting a unique 
platform (with equal wage increases) for all the employers' organisations, 
namely Confcommercio, Confesercenti, cooperative distribution and 
Federdistribuzione.  
 
5.2.4 Decentralised collective bargaining in the trade sector. 
In November 2016, Confcommercio signed an inter-confederal 
agreement with CGIL, CISL and UIL in order to establish a new system of 
industrial relations. This agreement refers to a previous text on 
representativeness, signed on November 2015, in which Confcommercio 
underlined its willingness to measure the representativeness of the 
employers’ organisations. This issue, together with an incomplete process 
for measuring trade union organisation is a major issue for the Italian 
system of industrial relations.  
This agreement is similar to (and followed) those signed by 
Confindustria on collective bargaining and representativeness (see above). 
In this text, the social partners reiterate the importance of a multi-level 
system of collective bargaining, at national and decentralised level. The 
national agreement remains the cornerstone of the system, in order to 
guarantee equal wages to all workers in the sector.  
Instead, it is possible to bargain territorial or company agreements by 
derogating from the national one only in specific conditions, explicitly 
established in the national collective agreement’s guidelines. (For instance, 
in order to foster employment growth, good working conditions and quality 
of work or to deal with an economic crisis.) The agreement aims at 
enhancing collective bargaining not only at company level but also at the 
territorial one in order to find the most appropriate solutions to the needs 
of companies of different sizes and to improve productivity. It is important 
to stress the usual size of firms in the trade sector: more than 1 million 
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firms (almost 97 per cent of all enterprises in the sector) had fewer than 
10 employees in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016). 
Derogating from the national collective agreement is possible only in 
four specified cases:  
(i)  in the event of a serious economic crisis;  
(ii)  in order to bolster employment;  
(iii)  to support development; and  
(iv)  to attract new investment (with particular regard to southern Italy).  
However, according to the national secretary of Uiltucs-UIL, these 
clauses have never been used. The only exception was in 2008, when 
derogation clauses were used to tackle the emersion of illegal work, 
especially in the south of Italy. 
Regarding the retail sector, in recent years the economic crisis has 
reduced the level and quality of decentralised collective bargaining. 
Especially in the retail sector, several large distribution firms have 
cancelled their company agreements. The situation described by a trade 
union official is not easy. ‘We tried to renew company agreements, but [...] 
on one hand there are very old contracts in the drawer, which nobody 
wants to question. Some have fixed wages, or particularly favourable 
terms. On the other hand, some contracts were signed during the economic 
crisis. It was very hard to renew them.’ 
‘We renewed only a few company agreements and they were all 
concessional’ (national secretary of Uiltucs-UIL). 
5.2.5 What changes have there been with regard to wages, working 
conditions and welfare in the trade sector? 
Regarding wages and labour costs, the Confcommercio national 
agreement establishes the so-called ‘economic guarantee element’. The 
‘economic guarantee element’ was introduced in the national collective 
agreement in 2011 and is an additional sum (ranging from 60 to 105 euros) 
that firms have to pay to their employees if a decentralised agreement 
cannot be reached. Firms with fewer than 30 employees (the majority in 
this sector) can chose to fix variable pay through a territorial agreement, 
or have to apply the ‘economic guarantee element’. On the other hand, 
firms with more than 30 employees can establish variable pay through 
company or territorial collective agreements. Otherwise, they have to apply 
the ‘economic guarantee element’. Workers will receive the next ‘economic 
guarantee element’ at the end of November 2017.  
‘It is important to note that in 2011 this sum was higher (from 85 to 
140 euros)’ (Marroni, Uiltucs-UIL national secretary). The national 
agreement also established a guideline in order to determine the conditions 
under which it is possible, at territorial or company level, to derogate from 
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national agreements. For instance, it is possible in tourist places to employ 
more ‘fixed term contract’ workers rather than the percentage fixed by the 
national agreement. Another possibility is to bargain territorial or company 
agreements to increase flexible working time. 
In 2015, the hourly minimum wage in the trade sector was about 8.43 
euros/hour. This is lower than the average of all sectors (about 9.41 
euros/hour) (Garnero, 2017). Other scholars who have examined minimum 
wages established in the National Trade Agreement confirm these data 
(Birindelli, 2017).25 
Significant changes that have spilled over to affect workers include 
increases in involuntary part-time work and temporary contracts, as well 
as a substantial increase in the use of vouchers (in particular in tourism). 
The use of involuntary part-time employment increased from 43 per cent 
in 2008 to 71 per cent in 2015.26 
The issue of welfare – at both national and company level – is 
becoming more important. Managed through a multi-level system of 
bilateral bodies and funds, this kind of ‘bilateral or collective agreement–
based welfare’ includes complementary pension schemes, integrative 
health insurance, income benefits, vocational training and other ‘flexible 
benefits’ paid for by joint contributions of enterprises and workers 
(especially supplementary pension schemes and health care).  
The most important inter-professional fund for lifelong learning in the 
sector is ‘For.Te’. A substantial number of small, medium-sized and large 
companies (operating in trade, tourism, services, logistics, shipping and 
transport) have chosen it.  
What is new is the introduction of a tax concession to improve welfare 
measures, collectively bargained, not only at decentralised level but (since 
the end of 2016) also at national level. 
 
According to the president of Confcommercio, Carlo Sangalli:  
 
Over a long period we were able to build a huge integrative welfare system, 
which covers millions of workers, via national bargaining. It’s an instrument 
of social justice, isn’t it? Supported by adequate incentives these instruments 
are able to guarantee a second welfare pillar … in a more mature way, in other 
European countries. (Official speech at annual national meeting of 
Confcommercio, 8 June 2017, Rome) 
                                                             
25According to Garnero (2017) the hourly minimum wage in the manufacturing sector is about 
9.47 euros/hour and – in contrast to the trade sector – ranges from 7.66 to 11.03 euros/hour. 
Birindelli (2017), by contrast, underlines the existing range in the trade sector between non-
fixed term workers (8.3 euros/hour) and fixed term workers (10.1 euros/hour). 
26 Trade union data. They explain this increase as a way to save jobs by avoiding layoffs. 
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Considering the significant and growing volume of financial resources and 
aims, the issue of transparent governance is fairly crucial. The aim of the 
social partners is to reduce the number of bilateral funds in order to 
increase the number of recipients and to make the services more efficient 
and appropriate to newly emerging needs. 
5.2.6 Critical issues and perspectives. 
The most critical and sensitive issue in the sector is the uncontrolled 
spread of national agreements (labelled ‘pirate’ agreements), signed by a 
growing number of new unions and employers’ organisations. The poorly 
institutionalised industrial relations system, based on social partner 
autonomy and voluntarism, is seriously compromised by the lack of a clear 
rule on representativeness. The risk is that wild cost competition and 
contractual dumping will be fostered, not only between workers, but also 
between firms. 
Employers who are not affiliated to any association are free to choose 
which national collective agreement to apply (comparing their costs and 
advantages), or otherwise to sign a new national agreement with a 
preferred union. 
 
It can be the Confcommercio or the Confesercenti national agreement, but 
also the Cisal agreement, which is much more advantageous for 
employers. This issue is crucial for the most representative unions. As 
underlined by the general secretary of Filcams-CGIL:  
 
There is no system that imposes a minimum wage that can be considered 
binding erga omnes! An employer association can say that it represents 1 
million firms but no one can checks it. CNEL (the relevant public authority) 
does not have a strong enough legislative architecture to verify whether the 
terms of an agreement constitute dumping.  
 
Moreover, the options for further derogations available to an employer 
opting for a ‘pirate’ national agreement will be much wider than in the case 
of the most representative national agreements. 
There is a strong link between the issue of measuring social partner 
representativeness and the contents and quality of the decentralisation 
bargaining process. In January 2016 the three confederal trade union 
asked for legislative measures: 
 
If we want to build an innovative and certain system of rules, it would be a 
major step forward to take what we have already designed in the framework 
agreements and to implement it in a law. (Filcams-CGIL general secretary)  
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Confcommercio is aware of the risk of wild competition and dumping. 
President Carlo Sangalli, in his official speech at the most recent 
Confcommercio conference (8 June 2017) said: 
 
We, at Confcommercio, are available to immediately verify our 
representativeness. It is an important factor in real economic democracy. We 
have underlined this belief also in the ‘reformist practice’ of the agreement on 
the contractual model, which we signed last November with CGIL, CISL and 
UIL. National collective bargaining agreements obviously affect different 
partners differently. Nevertheless, they are a "social capital" for everyone”. 
 
Finally, tax incentives introduced by the government to enhance 
productivity and increase competitiveness through collective agreements 
at company or territorial level, represent another challenge. In the trade 
sector, the problem is which criteria to adopt in order to measure 
productivity or quality improvements at territorial level, because more than 
1 million firms have fewer than 10 employees. 
6. The strategies of the social partners. 
What do the social partners think about the new reformed system of 
collective bargaining and wage setting? What are their aims? 
As far as the employers’ associations are concerned, there is no money 
for wage increases, as the wage rises they gave were higher than expected 
real inflation. Early in 2015, a bombshell was dropped at the opening of 
the bargaining session in the chemical sector by the employers, who 
demanded the restitution of 79 euros on the grounds that real inflation in 
the previous three-year period had been lower than forecast. In the end, 
an agreement was reached, but the situation remains uncertain and 
confused. Employers claim that no provisional indicator should be taken 
into consideration, all forms of automatism should be abrogated and only 
real, not forecast inflation should be taken into account. This applies 
particularly in the metal sector, in which the largest and most influential 
employers’ association, Federmeccanica, issued a position paper entitled 
‘Contractual Renewal’ in 2015. One of its key assumptions was that, at the 
present time, ‘nothing can be taken for granted’. The rules of collective 
bargaining must be rewritten.  
 
Our sector is no longer able to bear wage increases, which should be delinked 
from real company results because otherwise such increases would provoke a 
further loss of competitiveness and/or reduction of profit margins. ... Wage 
rises are possible only where gains are registered, that is, at the company 
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level, and must be strictly correlated with objective parameters of the 
profitability and productivity of individual firms. 
 
Beside variable wages, occupational welfare at company or territorial level 
plays a key role. Employers are willing to accept higher payments and 
vouchers for company health insurance, training and supplementary 
pensions. On this basis, the national sectoral agreement would maintain 
only a residual role of fixing a ‘guaranteed wage’ for workers not covered 
by any other decentralised performance-related wage increase. Its amount 
is defined every year, ex post – after the ISTAT data on the previous year 
– and not ex ante, as was previously the case, based on the anticipated 
inflation rate. Some of these claims were adopted in the most recent 
sectoral agreements, signed at the end of 2016 and approved by workers 
in a referendum (see the sectoral section of this chapter for an insight into 
the last sectoral collective agreement signed in December 2016). The metal 
workers unions agreed to some of these proposals, such as those 
concerning a new approach to contractual welfare and training, but 
rejected the substantial abandonment of the role of the national collective 
agreement, in consideration of the fact that wage increases would now 
refer to a mere 5 per cent of the sectoral workforce, which are now 
uncovered by any other proximity increment.  
Trade union confederations, as a whole, are fairly united in rejecting 
this approach, considering wage bargaining a matter of fairness, not to 
mention a key tool for boosting demand and production. The renewal of 
the numerous expired national agreements is a priority, starting with the 
large public sector, with its three million employees, in which wage 
bargaining has not occurred for the past six years.  
On 14 January 2016, CGIL, CISL and UIL signed an inter-confederation 
agreement entitled ‘A modern system of industrial relations for economic 
development based on innovation and quality of work’. The new strategy 
is focused on three pillars, with new rules on collective bargaining, 
participation and representation.27 As for the latter, the three 
confederations stress the importance of a more inclusive model of 
collective bargaining,28 still two-tier with primacy going to the national 
                                                             
27 Among the topics covered by collective bargaining, the agreement stresses the importance 
of active policies to enhance training and lifelong learning for workers, flexibility of 
employment relations, management of company crises, sub-contracting, bilateralism, 
bargained welfare plans and wage policies. 
28 Representing and extending legal and social protections to young, atypical and also migrant 
workers is today considered an absolute priority, in terms of both specific campaigns and 
mobilisation, but also – as in the case of CGIL’s programme – more inclusive collective 
bargaining with regard to their needs and conditions. A national petition for new Charter of 
Universal Labour Rights was launched by CGIL in April 2016, gathering signatures all over the 
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level. A wage expansion policy is required that could herald sustainable 
wage-driven growth. Wage increases beyond merely conserving 
purchasing power would act as an indispensable driver of consumption and 
domestic demand. The economic conditions considered relevant for 
economic policy will no longer be confined to the recovery of purchasing 
power, which has become marginal due to deflation, but will include 
macroeconomic variables such as industry output or average productivity.  
7. The challenge of the ‘Jobs Act’ and fiscal incentives 
for firm-level bargaining.  
A layering of heteronymous regulatory interventions intersects with 
the collective autonomy of the negotiating tables open around the reform 
and the relationship between the bargaining system, productivity and 
innovation, wage dynamic and welfare reform.  
The impact of the Renzi’s labor market reform (the so-called Jobs Act) 
in the sphere of collective bargaining has been substantial. In order to 
deviate from legal and common standards, the current government no 
longer delegates to collective bargaining, as was the case, for example, 
with the controversial Article 8 of Law no. 148/2011. Now it is the law that 
directly governs the most sensitive issues (Nunin, 2016; Gottardi, 2016), 
imposing ever worsening deregulation. It is as if the lawmaker no longer 
trusts the willingness of the social partners to negotiate the reforms needed 
to increase competiveness through more flexibility. This does not mean 
that collective bargaining has been side-lined completely; on the contrary, 
the number of referrals and delegations to collective bargaining are fairly 
numerous and affect sensitive issues, such as atypical contracts. But its 
role is quite strictly pre-conditioned by the purpose of introducing further 
flexibility in employment contracts and working conditions, in response to 
employer pressures (Fontana 2015; Nunin, 2016). Not only that, but in 
order to clarify the notion of ‘collective agreement’, the law refers to the 
‘national, territorial and company levels’ (Art. 51, Legislative Decree No. 
81/2015) indiscriminately, without any hierarchy being determined 
(Zoppoli, 2016; Passalacqua, 2016). In order to prevent contractual 
dumping, the law prescribes that delegated agreements must be agreed 
by comparatively the most representative trade union association, at 
national level, and by ‘their representatives’ or by the RSU at workplace 
level. 
                                                             
country, with the side request of a referendum on abrogating the legal provisions of the Jobs 
Act (Renzi’s labour market reform), whose more unfair outcomes include mini-jobs paid with 
vouchers worth 10 euros gross and the fact that instances of job reinstatement in cases of 
unfair dismissal have become few and far between.  
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For some commentators and scholars, this type of legal intervention is 
qualitatively more treacherous even than the already much criticised Article 
8. In the new system, in fact, contractual derogations are no longer 
conditional on any final outcome, while their stipulation in agreements not 
subject to the majority principle (Pizzoferrato, 2015; Zoppoli, 2016).  
In response to this the unions can to demand safeguarding clauses 
during the negotiations in order to halt or hedge against some of the most 
corrosive changes contained in the new legislation. A bitterly disappointed 
CGIL officer sums up the situation in this way: ‘I’ve spent my life 
negotiating the enforcement of the law and now I find myself having to 
negotiate against the law, or act as if it didn’t exist.’  
Besides this the legislator uses another lever, namely fiscal measures 
and incentives. It is not the first time that it has done this, because in 2012 
– through another tripartite framework agreement (again not signed by 
CGIL) – the government and the social partners tried to enhance 
productivity by reducing the tax burden on wage increases. With the 
Stability Law 2016 (no. 208/2015) and the following decree of 25 March 
2016, the social partners are encouraged to negotiate decentralised 
agreements aimed at improving performance through decentralised 
collective agreements. Collectively agreed productivity-related wage 
increases (also in the form of employee share options) are subject to lower 
taxation of just 10 per cent, up to maximum of 2,000 euros (up to 2,500 
for companies adopting forms of employees involvement), for employees 
who do not earn more than 50,000 euro gross per year. For 2017, this 
double ceiling was raised to 3,000 euros for the premium (4,000 euros for 
companies adopting forms of employee involvement), and to 80,000 for 
maximum income. 
In order to benefit from such a productivity premium, there have to be 
real improvements in terms of productivity, profitability, quality and 
innovation, resulting directly from company or territorial collective 
agreements. They have to define objectives and parameters in detail. If 
enterprises want to benefit from such tax concessions, improvements have 
to be real and measurable (production volumes, quality improvement of 
goods and processes, reorganisation of working time and smart working, 
employee involvement and direct participation in work organisation). 
Evaluating joint committees, formed by signatory social partners at the 
territorial level, will verify that employees will receive communications from 
their employers concerning the premium and its correct application. 
As an alternative to monetary bonuses, individual employees can opt 
– entirely or partly – for welfare and service benefits, identified and listed 
in specific plans by collective agreements at territorial or company level, 
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including such items as education, training, wellbeing and assistance for 
family members, including children, and elderly and dependent persons.  
The trade union confederations have reacted overall to such measures 
with a certain degree of openness, considering this challenge as a great 
opportunity to relaunch collective bargaining in terms of coverage and 
contents. An inter-confederate agreement was signed by CGIL, CISL, UIL 
and Confindustria on 14 July 2016; it aims to extend the new tax lowering 
measures to companies where workplace representations have not been 
set up. These documents define a template of territorial agreements, to be 
used in all companies affiliated to employers branch federations, apart from 
works councils.  
By October 2017, 26,000 had already been signed and registered; 
more than 80 per cent have been signed at company level, and concern 
productivity, profitability and quality. Approximately 5,000 documents 
concern welfare benefits. 
At least three kinds of risk have been highlighted by scholars and trade 
unionists: (1) employers might prefer to opt for less costly increases in the 
productivity premium and welfare benefits, which is much more convenient 
than the fully taxed increases in sectoral agreements (2) as the employees 
are free to choose between wage increases and welfare benefits, with the 
latter exempted from social security contributions, there could be a 
weakening of both welfare state and collective bargaining, which are 
increasingly being eroded by the individualisation of schemes and options; 
(3) most of these agreements seem to be nothing but ‘copy and paste’ 
templates, piled up on the desks of the competent public offices in charge 
of the difficult tasks of monitoring and authorisation. 
8. Final remarks. 
It is now time, in conclusion, to attempt some answers to our three 
opening questions about the main challenges that are changing the Italian 
industrial relations landscape. 
First, we mentioned the decline of neo-corporatist practices, which 
dominated industrial relations for fifteen years between 1992 and 2007. 
Since then, with the excuse offered by the crisis and the diktats imposed 
by the EU, the new political powers-that-be interpret government as a 
combination of technocracy and neo-populism, in which there is no place 
for intermediate bodies and their ‘tired rituals’. Following the eclipse of the 
historical major parties and their partial absorption by the ‘Blairite’ new 
Democratic Party, trade unions find themselves lacking a reliable partner 
and potential support in the political arena. This is a fact that unions are 
likely destined to have to cope with for the next years, forcing them to 
reduce their possible engagement in macro-policy and tripartite 
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concertation, refocusing their role and initiative in the classical areas of 
industrial relations: collective bargaining, involvement and participation, 
industrial conflict and campaigning.  
A second main issue, consequently, concerns the current relationship 
between legislation and collective autonomy. The traditional voluntarism of 
Italian industrial relations, quite peculiar today in comparative terms, 
seems to us to have reached a dead-end (Leonardi and Sanna, 2015). The 
landscape is at best chaotic and without clearly defined rules governing 
representation, with an increasing risk of wage dumping and downward 
competition. The choice once more for a voluntarist solution, as in the case 
of the new rules on representation and collective bargaining, has prevented 
the most recent inter-confederate agreements from acquiring the universal 
and binding characteristics indispensable for their effectiveness. A new 
public interventionism in the whole area of industrial relations 
(representation, collective bargaining, participation, conflict) would be 
opportune and many commentators, who in the past were sceptical in this 
regard, are now more or less in favour (Caruso, 2014; Treu, 2016; 
Gottardi, 2016; Carrieri, 2017). The problem is the kind of interventionism 
we can expect today, between the external pressures of globalisation and 
the internal weaknesses of the national economy and policy. The 
government no longer seems to operate as a third super-partes player, or 
in support of labour, as it did at the peak of post-war social policy, but on 
the contrary it enters the game overtly on the side of business, its needs 
and expectations (Guarriello, 2014; Bellardi, 2016).29 Paradoxically, such 
new and critical legislation is likely to tempt the unions to call for 
derogations from it (Art. 8) rather than the employers. 
A debate on the need for a specific law is on the cards and a number 
of bills are in the pipeline in parliament. The government may intervene in 
a whole range of industrial relations issues, after asking the social partners 
to express common positions, which at the moment are still lacking. One 
possible way, suggested by several commenters, could be to transpose into 
law what the social partners agree on, within the framework of auxiliary 
legislation, but there is resistance in some quarters in political parties and 
trade union confederations. The three main trade unions, with the 
document signed in January 2016, proposed to confer an erga omnes 
binding effect on industry-wide agreements, as foreseen in Article 39 of 
the Constitution. The choice is then to opt for an extension mechanism, in 
place of what is considered risky by the unions, namely the adoption of a 
statutory minimum wage. 
                                                             
29 As has been stated, as a result of the unprecedented subordination of workers’ rights to 
economic considerations labour law is changing its traditional paradigm, shifting the balance 
of power from the rights of the weaker party to the rights of the stronger (Mariucci, 2016). 
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A third and final issue, linked to the former, concerns the new structure 
of collective bargaining. Our conclusion here is that, despite the strong 
pressure from above (New European Economic Governance) and from 
below (firms’ exit strategies), the Italian system has maintained a certain 
degree of inter-sectoral coordination. The two traditional levels remain in 
place and, although weakened, neither has expressed a wish to abolish the 
role and primacy of the national sectoral agreement. Meanwhile, and 
importantly, relations between the three main trade union confederations, 
which deteriorated during the first decade of the new century, have 
improved substantially.  
Having said that, many serious criticisms have been raised. Some refer 
specifically to the national and sectoral levels. For example, the number of 
agreements should have been reduced drastically and instead it has 
doubled in just a few years, from fewer than 400 in 2008 to over 800 in 
2017, with a proliferation of agreements signed by associations of very 
uncertain and sometimes completely unknown representativeness. This 
means that the whole system is getting out of control. There is an evident 
problem with the legitimacy of the signatory actors, for example, in terms 
of transparency. In the absence of binding rules governing competitive 
pluralism, there is always a risk that the situation may descend into chaos, 
with the parties seeking judicial redress. This is not a problem only on the 
trade union side, but also – and perhaps even more serious – on the 
employers’ side, with regard to which information is almost entirely lacking. 
Someone have proposed the introduction of legislation along the lines of 
what is found in France in this regard. From this viewpoint – and this is one 
of the key assumptions of our study – the major threat to the system seems 
to come from the top, in terms of contractual dumping (Gottardi, 2016), 
rather than from below, where derogations seem to be relatively under 
control. Firm-level agreements as an alternative to the first sectoral level, 
have remained limited to the sole case of FIAT/FCA (ADAPT, 2017). 
However, the periods requested for renewals are, on average, 
intolerably protracted. Millions of workers must sometimes wait a one year 
or two for a renewal of their collective agreement, after it has expired. The 
stagnation of Italian wages in recent years is also a reflection of such 
dysfunction.  
Furthermore, the recovery of wages’ purchasing power, a pillar of the 
system when Italy boasted exceptionally high inflation, should not be the 
sole parameter referred to in a period of deflation. Other macroeconomic 
variables, national and specifically sectoral, must be introduced as 
benchmarks in the negotiations; sectoral average productivity, for 
instance.  
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At the same time, due to various impulses and pressures, company-
level bargaining has certainly been boosted. This has been possible 
‘qualitatively’, by (a) reducing some exclusive prerogatives of industry-
wide agreements, (b) weakening the role of external unions in coordination 
and (c) expanding the possibility for opening clauses and concession 
bargaining (Bellardi, 2016), but in quantitative terms, it has not taken off. 
The main reason, as we have seen, is the average size of Italian firms: 
they tend to be too small and unprepared to meet such a challenge, not to 
mention the ongoing crisis. Company bargaining would require specific 
expertise among the managerial staff that is usually missing, while works 
councils would have to be set up, with the risk of introducing 
unprecedented and confrontational industrial relations where they did not 
exist before. On this basis, we can talk of collective bargaining 
decentralisation without decentralised agreements in Italy. In the absence 
of firm-level collective agreements, productivity and wages increases are 
decided by employers on an individual and discretionary basis.  
In light of all this we should highlight: (i) the value of industry-wide 
bargaining as a fundamental and indispensable tool against inter-firm cut-
throat competition, enhancing the ‘high-road’ and socially sustainable 
competition, based on wage-driven growth of domestic demand; (ii) the 
importance of vertical and horizontal articulation or coordination of 
collective bargaining as a key condition for effective industrial relations. 
We should be able to figure out possible new collective-agreement units at 
an intermediate level between national sectors and firms; for instance, at 
the territorial level – as already fruitfully experienced in sectors and 
branches with a high concentration of small firms and casual work – or 
along the new value chains, including inter-sector site agreements, as 
proposed by some unions in the case of construction or big shopping malls 
and trade centres. 
In our view, we should not undervalue the importance and utility of 
broader and stronger collective bargaining at decentralised level, with a 
new focus on substantive innovation. In an era of world-class 
manufacturing, digitalisation and Industry 4.0, alongside a shrinking and 
recasting of the welfare state, the social partners should update their 
negotiating repertoire. For a country such as Italy, this means in particular 
significantly to improve employee involvement in work organisation in 
order to foster a consensual approach to process and product innovation. 
It is therefore necessary to invest more and more resources and capacity 
in vocational training and participatory models. But the new needs of 
employees with regard to work–life reconciliation, individual and collective 
services, well-being at work and efforts to tackle new forms of work-related 
stress are also important. A more inclusive collective bargaining is also 
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needed, capable of representing the interests of the atypical and vulnerable 
workers involved in new production processes.  
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